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Table 9 The effects of female directors with greater level of education, tenure and board meeting attendance on CSR performance

From: Board gender diversity and corporate social responsibility

Explanatory Variable

Explained Variables (current CSR performance: csrdummy)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

fdd*phd

0.00549

        

(1.57)

        

fdn*phd

 

0.00470***

       
 

(3.47)

       

fidd*phd

  

0.0123**

      
  

(2.47)

      

fdd*tenure

   

0.000583**

     
   

(2.07)

     

fdn*tenure

    

0.000281**

    
    

(2.00)

    

fidd*tenure

     

0.000288

   
     

(0.81)

   

fdd*attend

      

0.000118

  
      

(0.99)

  

fdn*attend

       

0.0000744**

 
       

(2.38)

 

fidd*attend

        

0.000109**

        

(1.96)

BD vars

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

CONTROLs

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

Constant

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

included

Num. of obs.

19,875

19,875

19,875

5,368

5,368

5,368

7,048

7,048

7,048

Adj. R-square

0.101

0.102

0.102

0.111

0.111

0.111

0.112

0.113

0.113

Prob. of F-stat.

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

  1. This table reports the regression estimates of the effects of female directors with greater level of education, tenure and board meeting attendance on CSR Performance (current CSR performance: csrdummy). The main explanatory variables in models (1) to (9) are, the intersection of the dummy of whether a firm has female director and whether firm’s female director has Ph.D. degree (fdd*phd), the intersection of the number of female director and whether firm’s female director has Ph.D. degree (fdn*phd), the intersection of the whether a firm has female independent director and whether firm’s female director has Ph.D. degree (fidd*phd), the intersection of the dummy of whether a firm has female director and female directors’ average tenure (fdd*tenure), the intersection of the number of female director and female directors’ average tenure (fdn*tenure), the intersection of the whether a firm has female independent director and female directors’ average tenure (fidd*tenure), the intersection of the dummy of whether a firm has female director and female directors’ average board meeting attendance rate (fdd*attend), the intersection of the number of female director and female directors’ average board meeting attendance rate (fdn*attend), the intersection of the whether a firm has female independent director and female directors’ average board meeting attendance rate (fidd*attend), respectively. Control variables include firm size (asset), debt ratio (debt), returns on assets (roa), institutional investors shareholdings (insthold), and the dummy of whether a firm is a family-controlled firm (family). The data period is from 2007 to 2020. The t-values of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively